MINORITIES, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE SECULAR INDIAN CONSTITUTION
Irfan Engineer
Secularism is understood differently by different analysts. We are not examining different concepts of secularism in this paper. However, one of the tests of secularism is the status of minorities and the treatment meted out to them by the state. The Part I of this paper in examines the concepts of minorities and their aspirations and rights. Part II of the paper will examine various provisions of the Indian Constitution and the state of minorities.
Minorities worldwide continue to suffer the after-effects of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the twin towers in US. Religious profiling, particularly of Muslims has increased worldwide, concludes “State of World’s Minorities and Indigenous peoples 2010”. In India too religious profiling of minorities, particularly the Muslim is on increase.
According to recent estimates, the world’s 184 independent states contain over 600 living language groups, and 5,000 ethnic groups[1]. Increased global contacts and interactions, and in particular extensive migrations, have placed diverse practices of different cultures next to one another.[2] Societies in most countries are now becoming more and more culturally diverse with co-existence of many traditions and customs, languages, religions and diverse ethnic and racial groups. The celebration of difference, respect for pluralism, and avowal of identity politics have come to be regarded as the hallmarks of a progressive, multicultural outlook and as the foundation of modern liberal democracies. Multiculturalism is becoming more acceptable. Over the past two decades, nations such as Australia, Canada and South Africa have created legal frameworks to institutionalize their existence as multicultural societies. Other countries such as Britain have no formal recognition of their multicultural status but have nevertheless pursued pluralist policies in a pragmatic fashion. While multiculturalism is something to be celebrated, it also poses some challenges. Minorities and majorities increasingly clash over such issues as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, land claims, immigration and naturalization policy, even national symbols, such as the choice of national anthem or public holidays[3]. It is common knowledge that ruling elites in a democracy are elected by majority vote of citizens. However, rule of the majority often becomes tyranny of the majority. It is in this context that minority rights become significant. It has been said that the real worth of democracy can be tested by how secure the minority feels within the state.
The majority and minority identities are often in conflict. Increasingly identity came to be seen not as something the self creates but as something through which the self is created. Identity is, in sociologist Stuart Hall’s words, ‘formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways in which we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us.’ [4] The inner self, in other words, finds its home in the outer world by participating in a collective.
Meaning of the term “Minority”
There is no universally acceptable definition of the term “minority”. League of Nations only dealt with certain states and specific population groups, these groups were called ad hoc ‘minorities’ without any discussion of a general definition.[5] In 1930, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), in its advisory opinion defined minority community as: “a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united by this solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instructions and upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other.”[6] According to this definition, race, religion, language and “traditions of their own” is signifier and an exhaustive criteria and a marker of the minority group. Ethnic and national minorities for example are not included amongst the criteria to identify the minorities. The group concerned should not only have a race, religion, language and traditions of their own, they should be united by this solidarity, in order to preserve their traditions and forms of worship and bring up their children in the spirit of these traditions. Another aspect of this definition is that the group having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own have to be living in a country or in a locality and to render mutual assistance to each other for preserving their traditions. International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences defines minorities as “A group of people – differentiated from others in the same society by race, nationality, religion, or language – who both think of themselves as a differentiated group and are thought of by others as a differentiated group with negative connotations. Further they are relatively lacking in power and hence are subjected to certain exclusions, discriminations, and other differential treatment. The important elements in this definition are a set of attitudes – those of group identification from within the group and those of prejudice from without – and a set of behaviours – those of self segregation from within the group and those of discrimination and exclusion from without.”[7] The definition of the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (IESS) introduces nationality also as criteria to differentiate a community. The IESS definition emphasises on two other aspects – a group of persons differentiated from others in the same society. Unlike the PCIJ, living in the same country or a locality is not necessary in the IESS definition. The important signifier is belonging to the same society but differentiated by race, nationality, religion or language. However, the IESS definition stresses on the fact that not only both the groups should think themselves and by others also as differentiated with negative connotation. The most important criteria introduced by the IESS definition of minority is the minority group so differentiated from the other group by race, nationality, language or religion should also be relatively lacking in power and should be subjected to certain exclusions, discriminations, and other differentiated treatment. Power wielding dominant elite (for example the whites in apartheid South Africa), though they are differentiated from others by race, religion, language or nationality, if they are not lacking in power and are not subjected to exclusions and discriminations cannot be categorized as a minority, though they would fall within the purview of the definition of minority as defined by the PCIJ advisory opinion. The IESS definition is therefore a functionalist definition.
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Recommendations 1201 (1993), “On an Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights reads as “a group of persons in a state who a) reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof, b) maintain long standing, firm and lasting ties with that state, c) display distinctive ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics, d) are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state and e) are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language.” This definition introduces even more stern conditions requiring the group to be of persons claiming to be minorities to be first citizens of the state, and numerical inferiority. This definition has several atypical features: not only does it lack any reference to a requirement of non-dominance, but also adds as explicit conditions a certain degree of permanence and a numerical threshold and that minority can be determined also at regional level and not only and necessarily at state level. [8]
The European Commission for Democracy through Law, an advisory body of the Council of Europe, has also suggested a definition of the word ‘minority’ as a part of a proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of Minorities, Article 2 reads as follows:
1. For the purpose of this Convention, the term “minority” shall mean a group which is smaller in number than the rest of the population of a State, whose members, who are nationals of that State, have ethnical, religious or linguistic features different from those of the rest of the population, and are guided by the will to safeguard their culture, traditions, religion or language.
2. Any group coming within the terms of this definition shall be treated as an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority.
3. To belong to a national minority shall be a matter of individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice.[9]
UN Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti argues that the objectively recognizable fact of having ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population should be the starting point of every effort to formulate a definition of ‘minority’. Most authors agree that this is a crucial factor. According to Packer, not characteristics but desires and wishes differ (J. Packer, “On the Definition of Minorities”). According to Packer, Minorities should be defined as a group of people who freely associate for an established purpose where their shared desire differs from that expressed by the majority rule. Capotorti’s definition uses the “rest of the population as the reference point, whereas Deschenes refers to the ‘majority of the state’. The former definition has the advantage that is easier to argue that the point of reference need not necessarily be one monolithic bloc but can consist several ethnic, religious or linguistic groups. That argument is of course specifically important for plural societies without clear majority group since the several ethnic, religious or linguistic groups could all be minorities in so far as they satisfy the other relevant conditions.[10] Furthermore, the reference to the ‘rest of the population of the state’ raises the interesting question whether a minority can also be determined in comparison with the population of a region, or a province or some other kind of internal political structure within a state. In this regard, a restrictive attitude tends to predominate since normally the state is taken as the exclusive point of reference. [11] Neither the international nor the European documents that are relevant for minority protection allow the inference that minorities can also be defined as a sub-state level. The Human Committee did adopt this restrictive stance in its views in Ballantyne et al v. Canada (Communication Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, UN Doc. CCPR / C / 47 / D359 / 1989 / Rev.13st March 1993) as it argues that the English speaking persons in the French speaking province cannot be considered a minority because they constitute the majority nationwide. According to the Committee article 27 ICCPR would only apply to minorities at the national level.[12] Regarding the kind of dominance or better the domains in which there can be dominance, it has been postulated that not only political power relations in the state are at issue but also the minority’s economic, cultural or social status. Although it is conceivable that a politically dominated majority can still influence the dominant minority culturally, both domains cannot be completely separated because those with political power also have the means to have a direct influence on the cultural and socio-economic status of the other population groups. Dominant minorities after having lost their dominance, could qualify as minorities under international law. The opinion that the concept ‘minority’ can only apply to groups of people who have the nationality of the country of residence, can to certain extent be traced back to the League of Nations. Documents concerning Protection of minorities contain three categories of rights, namely and in order of increasing scope of rights, one for all members of the state, one for nationals of the state and finally one for all members of minorities who are nationals. Finally, an issue which is related to the subjective component of a definition of ‘minority’ is the choice left to members of minorities whether or not to be treated as a minority.[13]
Francesco Capotorti defined minorities as:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, religion or language. [14]
The danger in affirming differences is that the implementation of group-conscious policies will reinstate stigma and exclusion. In the past, group-conscious policies were used to separate those defined as different and exclude them from access to the rights and privileges enjoyed by dominant groups. A crucial principle of democratic pluralism, then is that group-specific rights and policies should stand together with general civic and political rights of participation and inclusion. Group-conscious policies cannot be used to justify exclusion of or discrimination against members of a group in the exercise of general political and civil rights. A democratic pluralism thus requires a dual system of rights: which are the same for all, and a more specific system of group-conscious policies and rights.[15] In the words of Kenneth Karst: “When the promise of equal citizenship is fulfilled, the paths to belonging are opened in two directions for members of cultural minorities. As full members of the larger society, they have the option to participate to whatever degree they choose. They also may look inward, seeking solidarity within their cultural group, without being penalized for that choice”[16]
Protective measures for minorities
a. Approaches towards minorities: Melting Pot or Multicultural?
During and immediately after the First World War, the concept of the melting pot was equated with complete cultural assimilation towards an Anglo-American norm (“Anglo-conformity”) on the part of immigrants, and immigrants who opposed such assimilation were accused of disloyalty to the United States. The melting pot is a metaphor for a heterogenous society becoming more homogenous, the different elements “melting together” into a harmonious whole with a common culture. It is particularly used to describe the assimilation of immigrants to the United States; the melting-together metaphor was in use by the 1780s. [17] It signifies cultural assimilation and acculturation; melting of cultures and intermarriages of ethnicities. The melting pot is at the origins of multiculturalism. It is considered to be the historic foundation of American integration policy, and represents society as a giant pestle and mortar, where cultural origins and differences were crushed and blended. Many saw the melting pot as the model to follow for all multi-ethnic societies.[18] To achieve this ideal of homogenous polity, governments throughout history have pursued a variety of policies regarding cultural minorities. Some minorities were physically eliminated, either by mass expulsion (what we now call ‘ethnic cleansing’) or by genocide. Other minorities were coercively assimilated, forced to adopt the language, religion, and customs of the majority. In yet other cases, minorities were treated as resident aliens, subjected to physical segregation and economic discrimination, and denied political rights.[19]
The early 1970s marked the emergence of the multicultural movement at first in Canada and Australia and then in the U.S.A., U.K., Germany and elsewhere. It has now begun to dominate the political agenda of even France, the strongest bastion of the nation state.[20] Its central insights are three. First, human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they grow up and live within a culturally structured world and organize their lives and social relations in terms of a culturally derived system of meaning and significance. This does not mean that they are determined by their culture in the sense of being unable to rise above its categories of thought and critically evaluate its values and system of meaning, but rather that they are deeply shaped by it, can overcome some but not all of its influences, and necessarily view the world from within a culture, be it the one they have inherited and uncritically accepted or reflectively revised or, in rare cases, one they have consciously adopted. Second, different cultures represent different systems of meaning and visions of the good life. Since each realizes a limited range of human capacities and emotions and grasps only a part of the totality of human existence, it needs other cultures to help it understand itself better, expand its intellectual and moral horizon, stretch its imagination, save it from narcissism to guard it against the obvious temptation to absolutize itself, and so on. This does not mean that one cannot lead a good life within one’s own culture, but rather that, other things being equal, one’s way of life is likely to be richer if one also enjoys access to others, and that a culturally self-contained life is virtually impossible for most human beings in the modern, mobile and interdependent world. Nor does it mean that all cultures are equally rich and deserve equal respect, that each of them is good for its members, or that they cannot be compared and critically assessed. All it means is that no culture is wholly worthless, that it deserves at least some respect because of what it means to its members and the creative energy it displays, that no culture is perfect and has a right to impose itself on others, and that cultures are best changed from within. Third, every culture is internally plural and reflects a continuing conversation between its different traditions and strands of thought. This does not mean that it is devoid of coherence and identity, but that its identity is plural, fluid and open. Cultures grow out of conscious and unconscious interactions with each other, define their identity in terms of what they take to be their significant other, and are at least partially multicultural in their origins and constitution. Each carries bits of the other within itself and is never wholly sui generis. This does not mean that it has no powers of self-determination and inner impulses, but rather that it is porous and subject to external influences which it assimilates in its now autonomous ways.[21] Rajeev Bhargav situates Multiculturalism in three stages. The first moment in this dialectic is the moment of particularized hierarchy wherein relations between different communities are based on hierarchical relations. Bhargava calls second moment as moment of universalistic equality wherein significance of cultural differences is underemphasized and deemed inconsequential. What matters is status as individual and their membership in an abstracted political community. The third moment is moment of particularized equality where people are different but equal. Membership in a particular cultural group is important but so is the relationship of equality among different cultural communities. No community, therefore no member of it can be subordinate to other communities or its members.[22] Communities aspire for social recognition. People want their identities and significant attributes of their community to be not merely socially acknowledged but publicly endorsed and respected. For example, groups may be accorded special rights to express their cultural particularity, be given a voice in the political process by special representation rights, may procure special subsidies from the state or even right of self governance if concentrated in particular territory.[23] A Sikh may want to be accorded concession to wear their turbans and kirpans in public institutions or religion based family laws are made applicable to particular communities. Bhargav says that demands for a multicultural society constitute a plea for egalitarian multiculturalism. Neither class nor levels of achievement is the basis of recognition but rather one’s overall way of life, a culture. Any politics that requires exclusion of cultural identity as a condition for membership or recognition is ruled out. A demand to renounce cultural identity as a condition for free and equal citizenship no longer appears to be viable.
Multiculturalists claim that assimilation can hurt minority cultures by stripping away their distinctive features. They point to situations where institutions of the dominant culture initiate programs to assimilate or integrate minority cultures.
Although some multiculturalists admit that assimilation may result in a relatively homogeneous society, with a strong sense of nationalism, however, where minorities are strongly urged to assimilate, there may arise groups which fiercely oppose integration. With assimilation, immigrants lose their original cultural (and often linguistic) identity and so do their children. Immigrants who fled persecution or a country devastated by war were historically resilient to abandoning their heritage once they had settled in a new country. Multiculturalists note that assimilation, in practice, has often been forced, and has caused immigrants to have severed ties with family abroad.
Multiculturalists typically support loose immigration controls and programs such as multilingual education and affirmative action, which offer certain privileges to minority and/or immigrant groups, cultural pluralism and diversity of traditions and customs. Affirmative action is generally defended as a temporary measure which is needed to move more rapidly towards a ‘colour-blind’ society. It is intended to remedy years of discrimination, and thereby move us closer to the sort of society that would have existed had we observed the separation of state and ethnicity from the beginning. Opponents of multiculturalism often say that it ghettoizes minorities, and impedes their integration into mainstream society; proponents respond that this concern for integration reflects cultural imperialism.[24]
Will Kymlicka outlines two broad patterns of cultural diversity. In the first case, cultural diversity arises from the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into larger state. These incorporated cultures, typically wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies. Kymlicka[25] also calls such minorities as “national minorities”. The Sikhs in Punjab, Kashmiris and various ethnic groups in North East fall in this pattern. In the second case, cultural diversity arises from individual and familial immigration. Such immigrants often coalesce into loose associations which can be called ‘ethnic groups’. The religious minorities in India confirm to this pattern. They typically wish to integrate into the larger society, and to be accepted as full members of it. While they often seek greater recognition of their ethnic identity, their aim is not to become a separate and self-governing nation alongside the larger society, but to modify the institutions and laws of the mainstream society to make them more accommodating cultural differences.
India too proclaimed the Melting Pot model claiming that all the races and cultures of migrants fused into one culture. However, there is increased realization of multicultural approach.
Protection and Non-Discrimination
Members of minorities are in a vulnerable position in society. An effective protection of human rights is indeed very important to them… The vulnerability of minorities flows from their non-dominance in combination with their numerical inferiority as these imply a virtual absence of political influence in decisional bodies at legislative and executive level. [26] It was earlier policy of most of the states to assimilate the minorities into the mainstream. Simply put this meant that while minorities would be guaranteed protection and security, it was expected that they would gradually affirm the culture, language or religion of the majority. If the minority concerned resisted assimilation, their case for protection and security would weaken. Security is the pursuit of freedom from threat – this pursuit is affected by five major factors – military, political, economic, societal or environmental factors.[27] Societal security, according to B. Buzan, (People, States and Fear, 1991), concerns “the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom”.[28]
The UN Sub-Commission acknowledged at a rather early stage, in accordance with the advisory opinion of the PCIJ regarding minority schools in Albania, that the minority issue demands a double approach, namely the prohibition of discrimination and special measures to enable the members of minorities to preserve and develop their own, separate characteristics. The first pillar deals with rules that are expressions and further elaborations of the prohibition of discrimination. Such rules guarantee formal equality and are at the same time conducive to achieve substantive equality… Substantive or real equality can indeed require differential treatment for people in different circumstances. For (members of) minorities these rules would be focused on devising appropriate means to retain and promote their distinctive characteristics.[29] McKean (in Equality and Discrimination under International Law, 1983) finds that prohibition of discrimination and minority protection are not identical but are “twin concepts”.[30] Mc Kean says that protective measures providing for “special rights for minority groups” (such as to maintain their own languages, culture, and religious practices, and to establish schools, libraries, churches, and similar institutions), produce “an equilibrium” between different situations and “should be maintained as long as the groups concerned wish.”[31] Minority protection could be described as ‘the best possible accommodation of the ethnic, religious and linguistic population diversity in these societies[32]. Minority protection is justified by, and has as its main aims, the protection of human dignity of individuals, members of minorities, the preservation of peace, and the preservation of cultures.[33]
Affirmative Action
Eide, in his report on “solutions to problems involving minorities”, describes affirmative action in the following way:
Affirmative action is preference, by way of special measures, for certain groups or members of such groups (typically defined by race, ethnic identity or sex) for the purpose of securing adequate advancement of such groups or their individual members in order to ensure equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.[34]
McKean examines the concept of “special measures” in relation to the main international instruments on discrimination and points that affirmative measures, are temporary and compensatory.[35] A handicap, for example, is an unchosen circumstance for which redistributive compensation is appropriate for persons affected by it. Expensive tastes on the other hand are a matter of preference and no compensation is due to persons who have them.[36] Kymlicka draws upon this distinction between an unchosen circumstance where compensation is appropriate and mere preference for which it is not. As culture is an unchosen circumstance, not a matter of taste or preference, compensation in the form of affirmative action is due. Cohen disagrees that culture is an unchosen circumstance. According to him, culture is involuntary tastes, part of a person’s constitution in that she can be properly satisfied only by her own particular culture. The same resources do not yield the same amount of satisfaction for everybody because by virtue of their respective cultures, people differ in capacity to obtain fulfillment from identical quantity of resources. Cohen argues that if people happen to have physical handicap by birth or history, and if redistributive compensation is justified, people who happen to have expensive tastes, like culture, by birth or history, redistributive compensation is justified. Justice requires that equality of resources yield to equality of access advantage. [37]
Interventionist policy by the state may be endorsed on the ground that some otherwise unrealizable value inheres in every cultural group, so that the will being of the whole society is dependent on the health of stable cultural groups within it and the stability of such groups, dependent in turn on some commitment on the part of the state to encourage or support them.[38]
According to Capotorti, in principle, even quite a small group has the right to claim the protection provided for in Article 27, to the extent to which it seems reasonable to expect the state to introduce special measures of protection. It is in any event very difficult to give an absolute number of percentages that can be used as a numerical threshold.[39] The members of minorities who are not citizens of the State enjoy protection – guaranteed by League of Nations – of life and liberty and the free exercise of their religion, while minorities who were citizens enjoy amongst other rights, equality of rights in civil and political matters, and in matters related to primary education. Another set of rights is even more obviously related to the need for minorities to protect their own, separate identity. They concern either specific identity characteristics on the basis of which minorities distinguish themselves from the rest of the population or mechanisms and institutions guaranteeing or improving the protection and promotion of their separate identity. Cultural rights are generally important for members of minorities, especially to the extent that they are related to the protection and promotion of their own culture and way of life. … through a focus on multiculturalism, which implies a society where several individuals and groups can flourish in the full diversity of their respective cultures.[40] Right to traditional way of life is issue of crucial importance to minorities. (e.g. construction of a dam or displacement can threaten right to traditional way of life) The European Commission for Human Rights in G and E v. Norway, Eur. Comm. H.R., 35, held that although the Art. 8 of ECHR does not guarantee any specific rights for members of minorities, they can nevertheless rely on article 8 to claim a right to respect for their own way of life. The Commission stated more specifically that ‘a particular lifestyle of a minority is protected by article 8 as part of private life, family life or home’ but such right to respect one’s own way of life is, if necessary, subordinate to more important public interest.
A section of liberals are vary of collective rights. They press for individual rights vis-à-vis the state and the collective. The rhetoric about individual versus collective rights is unhelpful. We need to distinguish two kinds of claim that an ethnic or national group might make. The first involves the claim of a group against its own members; the second involves the claim of a group against the larger society. Both kinds of claims can be seen as protecting the stability of national of ethnic communities, but they respond to different sources of instability.[41]
[1] Kymlicka, Will (1996): Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, OUP
[2] Sen, Amartya (2006): The Uses and Abuses of Multiculturalism: Chili and Liberty, published in Indian Journal of Secularism, Mumbai, Vol. 10, No. 2, July-Sept. 2006
[3] Kymlicka, Will op. cit.
[4] Quoted in an article by Kenan Malik: “Identity is That Which is Given By” circulated through an e-mail Original forward from Asiapeace, omarali502000@yahoo.com, on 16th July 2008.
[5] Henrard, Kristin (2000): Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination, published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000
[6] quoted by Kristin Henrard: 2000 op. cit.
[7] International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1972, Vol. 10, p. 365
[8] Kristin Henrard (2000) op. cit.
[9] quoted in Kristin Henrard 2000 op. Cit.
[10] Kristin Henrard 2000 op.cit.
[11] Kristin Henrard 2000 op.cit.
[12] Kristin Henrard 2000 op.cit.
[13] Kristin Henrard 2000 op.cit.
[14] Åkermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou (1997): Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London,
[15] Young, Iris Marion (2005): Justice and Politics of Difference in Susan S. Fainstein and Lisa J. Servon (eds.), Gender and Planning: A Reader, Rutgers University Press
[16] Iris Marion Young, Justice and Politics of Difference in Susan S. Fainstein and Lisa J. Servon(eds.), Gender and Planning: A Reader, Rutgers University Press 2005
[17] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melting_pot#Melting_pot.2C_cultural_pluralism.2C_multiculturalism
[18] http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/16216/melting-pot-or-salad-bowl.html
[19] Kymlicka, Will (1996): Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, OUP
[20] Parekh, Bhikhu: What is multiculturalism? http://www.india-seminar.com/1999/484/484%20parekh.htm
[21] Parekh, Bhikhu: What is multiculturalism? http://www.india-seminar.com/1999/484/484%20parekh.htm
[22] Bhargava, Rajeev (1999): Introducing Multiculturalism in Multiculuturalism, Liberalism and Democracy, Bhargava, Rajeev; Bagchi Amiya Kumar & Sudarshan, R (eds.) OUP, New Delhi, 1999
[23] Bhargava, Rajeev (1999): Introducing Multiculturalism in Multiculuturalism, Liberalism and Democracy, Bhargava, Rajeev; Bagchi Amiya Kumar & Sudarshan, R (eds.) OUP, New Delhi, 1999
[24] Kymlicka, Will (1996): Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, OUP
[25] Kymlicka, Will (1996): Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, OUP
[26] Kristin Henrard 2000 op.cit.
[27] Akermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou (1997) Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law. London, The Hague, and Boston: Kluwer Law International.
[28] Quoted in Akermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou (1997) Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law. London, The Hague, and Boston: Kluwer Law International.
[29] Kristin Henrard 2000 op.cit.
[30] quoted in Akermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou (1997) Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law. London, The Hague, and Boston: Kluwer Law International.
[31] quoted in Akermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou (1997) Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law. London, The Hague, and Boston: Kluwer Law International.
[32] Kristin Henrard 2000 op.cit.
[33] Akermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou (1997) Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law. London, The Hague, and Boston: Kluwer Law International.
[34] quoted in Akermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou (1997) Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law. London, The Hague, and Boston: Kluwer Law International.
[35] quoted in Akermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou (1997) Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law. London, The Hague, and Boston: Kluwer Law International.
[36] Dworkin, quoted by Kymlicka, Will Liberalism, Community and Culture, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989
[37] Quoted by Bhargava, Rajeev (1999): Introducing Multiculturalism in Multiculuturalism, Liberalism and Democracy, Bhargava, Rajeev; Bagchi Amiya Kumar & Sudarshan, R (eds.) OUP, New Delhi, 1999
[38] Raz, J., ‘Multiculturalism: A liberal Perspective’, in Ethics in the Public Domain, Clarendon, Oxford, 1994, pp. 158-9, quoted by Bhargava, Rajeev (1999): Introducing Multiculturalism in Multiculuturalism, Liberalism and Democracy, Bhargava, Rajeev; Bagchi Amiya Kumar & Sudarshan, R (eds.) OUP, New Delhi, 1999
[39] quoted in Kristin Henrard 2000 op.cit.
[40] Kristin Henrard 2000 op.cit.
[41] Kymlicka, Will (1996): Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, OUP