PERVEZ HOODBHOY INTERVIEWED BY SAURABH SHARMA, 5 JULY 2026
Q.1 You were among more than 100 prominent citizens from India and Pakistan who signed a joint appeal urging Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shehbaz Sharif to resume dialogue. How did this initiative begin, who brought together the signatories, and what discussions preceded the final appeal?
A.1 The appeal arose from a virtual meeting of Indians and Pakistanis on June 12, 2026. Many of us have known each other for decades, and all of us are completely fed up with the hatemongering and propaganda directed against each other’s countries. The India-Pakistan Citizen Dialogue was organized by the Socialist Party of India and the Centre for Peace and Secular Studies Pakistan. As people who enjoy some degree of visibility in our respective societies, we feel that speaking up for peace is vital at a time when hostile propaganda abounds and no official engagement between New Delhi and Islamabad is in sight. Our intervention simply reflects the fact that large numbers of ordinary Indians and Pakistanis actually want to live together as normal neighbors, instead of screaming at each other.
Q.2 India has maintained that terrorism and talks cannot proceed together. In the aftermath of the Baisaran attack, which killed 26 people, and India’s subsequent Operation Sindoor, why do you believe New Delhi should consider talks with Pakistan at this moment?
A.2 Times have changed since the early 1990s, when Pakistan-based jihadists waged war across the border. Speaking for myself, I emphatically opposed this secret war in my writings, public speeches, and TV appearances for 30 years. But can I say that the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack was planned and supported by Pakistani authorities, or that they outsourced the task? Possibly, but there is no smoking gun. One cannot rule out that the perpetrators were simply crazed local Kashmiris. Nuclear-armed states cannot afford to go to war on the basis of a mere surmise.
Pakistan has changed: while some residual jihadist elements may still linger, they are invisible now—as opposed to being highly visible in the past. Operation Sindoor was a bad idea. It achieved nothing except to make the military stronger within Pakistan and, strangely enough, turned Pakistan into a celebrated global peacemaker. Now, there are voices shouting for Asim Munir and Shehbaz Sharif to get the Nobel Peace Prize!
Q.3 Critics in India argue that repeated peace initiatives lose credibility when Pakistan-based terror groups continue to be accused of planning or sheltering those responsible for attacks in India. What would you say to those who believe that dialogue without demonstrable action against such groups only rewards Pakistan’s security establishment?
A.3 There certainly has been demonstrable action; Pakistan has moved on. Before 9/11, our cities were swarming with armed Islamic groups that moved around freely, openly solicited donations from the public, and promised eternal jihad in Kashmir and India. Hafiz Saeed, Masood Azhar, Malik Ishaq, and Syed Salahuddin were some of the prominent leaders back then. All have disappeared from public view and are said to be living miserable existences. It appears that the jihadist infrastructure of the last decade or two has been pretty much disassembled. The reason wasn’t some sudden military action by India; it was a direct consequence of India moving the Paris-based FATF, which forced a change in practice.
Q.4 Field Marshal Asim Munir’s remarks last year drawing a sharp civilisational distinction between Hindus and Muslims have revived concerns about the continuing influence of the Two-Nation Theory in Pakistan’s strategic thinking. Do such statements undermine the very premise of peace-building with India?
A.4 You are correct that the Pakistani establishment periodically flogs the dead horse known as the Two-Nation Theory—a theory that was effectively washed into the Bay of Bengal in 1971. But don’t we see a powerful revival of that very same theory among Hindu nationalists in today’s India? They would have us believe that all Indian Muslims belong to a separate “Muslim nation” and cannot be equal citizens in an India that they feel should be exclusively Hindu. Statements to this effect come from the highest echelons of the BJP, and today, both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha have exactly zero Muslim members.
Q.5 Pakistan’s political and military leadership has made strong statements on the Indus Waters Treaty, including warnings that any disruption of water flows could have serious consequences. How damaging has the water dispute become, and can it be separated from the wider political and security tensions between the two countries?
A.5 Reneging on a solemn accord because of political differences puts all international agreements up for grabs. Back in the 1960s, water wasn’t such a massive issue; nobody had envisioned climate change or the kind of intense population pressure we face today. Both countries are now dissatisfied with the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), each claiming they were short-changed.
Of course, water disputes are everywhere: a Chinese project threatens the Brahmaputra in both India and Bangladesh, and an Ethiopian dam two thousand miles from the Nile Delta could wreck agriculture in Egypt. But it is pretty obvious that India controls the tap, and water is a life-or-death matter for Pakistan. The IWT should not have been touched. Using water as a weapon is morally wrong, uncivilized, and will have incredibly ugly consequences.
Q.6 There have been reports of informal or Track-II contacts between individuals from India and Pakistan, though the Indian side has clarified that these were individual initiatives and not government-mandated backchannel talks. In your view, can unofficial dialogue still create conditions for official engagement, or is it largely symbolic without political backing?
A.6 Symbols are important, and so are individual contacts. They demonstrate that even in these grim times, all is not lost. It makes absolutely no sense for two massive countries to be perpetually at war with each other, especially in a nuclear age where neither side can ever be the victor.
Q.7 If formal dialogue were to resume, what should be the first and most practical point of engagement? Should it begin with ceasefire stabilisation along the Line of Control, counterterrorism assurances, humanitarian issues, trade, visas, or the Indus Waters Treaty?
A.7 I would say pretty much all of those would naturally follow once there is an initial thaw.
Q.8 Do you think domestic politics plays a role in maintaining the state of hostilities?
A.8 Beyond doubt, it does. That the 2024 elections were stolen is a solid fact. I did not vote for Imran Khan or his party, but most did. Had Operation Sindoor not happened, the present political setup would be floundering for lack of legitimacy. Ramping up domestic opinion against Modi’s India is the perfect foil for them. As for Indian politics: whipping up anti-Pakistan sentiment and equating Indian Muslims with Pakistan is part of a highly successful electoral strategy.
Q.9 At a time when public opinion in both countries is deeply polarised and political rhetoric is increasingly hostile, what can civil society, academics, journalists and former officials realistically do to rebuild even a minimal level of trust between India and Pakistan?
A.9 The June dialogue came up with a solid, practical list of things for India and Pakistan to do:
Start official-level talks;
· Relax travel and visa restrictions;
· Resume bilateral trade and allow overflights;
· Demilitarize the Siachen glacier;
· Stop the jingoistic exhibitionism at the Wagah border;
· And finally, end cross-border internet blockages.
Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, an MIT educated nuclear physicist and public intellectual, lives in Islamabad where he teaches physics and mathematics. His most recent book is “Pakistan: Origins, Identity, and Future”.
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